Container Legislation, Equal Protection, Commerce Clause, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company by Paynter, Craig B.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Container Legislation, Equal Protection,
Commerce Clause, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Company
Craig B. Paynter
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paynter, Craig B. (1982) "Container Legislation, Equal Protection, Commerce Clause, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf




The Court's decision in Associated Dry Goods acts as a reaffirmation
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kessler. While an open disclosure policy
has been adopted, the EEOC will have to restrict the access of related em-
ployee files to aggrieved individual employees. The Court expressed concern
with the importance of the private right of action under Title VII, where
the charging party acts as a "private attorney general"6 whose purpose
is to further effectuate the ban on employment discrimination. However,
the balance between administrative and judicial functions of the EEOC
may have been disrupted by the army of "attorney generals" which the
Court has enlisted. With full disclosure of conciliatory information, the
individual employee wields a powerful weapon. The effectiveness of this
weapon eventually may be eliminated, however, if employers refuse to
cooperate with the EEOC in voluntarily providing the ammunition of sta-
tistical information during prelitigation conciliation and negotiation attempts.
KENNETH WITTENAUER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Container Legislation e Equal Protection * Commerce Clause
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981)
T HE PROBLEMS of litter, solid waste, and natural resource depletion are
often inexorably linked to the liquid manufacturing and packaging
industry. Legislative efforts to ameliorate these problems may therefore
involve various controls of containers.' When states enact container legis-
lation, however, terms must be carefully chosen to avoid conflict with both
state and federal constitutions.!
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,' the United States Supreme
Court struck down an equal protection challenge to state legislation banning
certain containers in the milk industry. The Court's approach to this chal-
lenge is striking; equally significant is the Court's departure from its usual
o Id. at 824.
1 See generally Greef & Martin, Beverage Container Legislation: A Policy and Constitutional
Evaluation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 351 (1974).
2 The most frequent challenges involve claimed violations of the Due Process, Equal Pro-
tection and Commerce clauses.
3101 S. CL 715 (1981).
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stance of avoiding Constitutional issues when there are other possible grounds
for decision.
The stated purpose of the Minnesota statute controlling milk con-
tainers was to reduce the problems of litter, solid waste and resource de-
pletion, all of which were legislatively determined to be exacerbated by the
use of the banned containers. In compliance with state policy of encouraging
the reuse and recycling of material to reduce amounts of solid waste,5 the
container statute specifically expresses a preference for returnable and
reusable packaging.' The statutory ban, however, extends only to the sale
of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers." No other sub-
stances, such as paperboard, are specifically prohibited.'
A group composed of milk packagers, sellers and persons involved in
the manufacture and distribution of plastic containers9 challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute. The Minnesota District Court held"0 that the
statute was unconstitutional in that (1) it deprived plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the law in contravention of the fourteenth amendment," (2)
it deprived plaintiffs of substantive due process in contravention of the
fourteenth amendment"2 and the Minnesota constitution, 8 and it constituted
an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce in contravention of the
Constitution. "
The district court stated that "the actual basis of the statute was to
promote economic interests of certain segments of the local dairy and
pulpwood industry."" The court reasoned that since the statute would not en-
courage the use of returnable containers which is the stated goal, the means
chosen were not rationally related to the public purpose to be served.'
Consequently, the statute constituted an "unreasonable, arbitrary and
4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116 F.21 (West 1980).
5Id. at § 116 F.01 (West 1977).
e Id. at § 116 F.21 (West 1980).
7 Id. at § 116 F.22. See also Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn.
1979).8 Minnesota's regulation of milk containers in this manner is unique. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 721, n. 3. Plastic and paperboard containers have been banned
by executive action in Ontario, Canada. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d
at 81, n. 6. (Minn. 1979).
9 Plaintiffs included Society of Plastics Industry, Inc., Phillips Petroleum Co., Hoover
Universal, Inc., M-H Packaging Systems, Inc., Clover Leaf Creamery Co., Wells Dairy,
Inc., Weber & Barlow Store, Inc., and Marigold Foods, Inc. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v.
State 289 N.W.2d at 80, n.l.
'0 ld. at 80, n.2.
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 Id.
i8 MnIN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-24, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S.
Ct. 715 (1981). (The decision of the District Court of Minnesota is unreported.)
%Old. at A-25-27.
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capricious interference with the production, marketing and consumption
of milk.""
The opinion ostensibly recognized the "presumption of validity" which
is given state legislation when challenged on equal protection grounds.'"
Yet, the district court held that the statute was unconstitutional since it
failed to bear a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court limited its decision to the equal pro-
tection issue 01 which it considered to be determinative. 1 The court con-
ceded that the statute "deals with legitimate state interests 22 of encouraging
the recycling of materials and reducing solid wastes. However, following
a review of the debates, relevant findings of fact and documentary material,
the supreme court found that the statute bore no rational relation to that
legitimate state interest.2' The decision of the district court was affirmed.
A persuasive dissent by Justice Wahl'5 argued that an economically
motivated legislative remedy may proceed in a step-by-step fashion, a point
recently reiterated by the United States Supreme Court in New Orleans v.
Dukes." The Court stated in Dukes that it was not the function of the Su-
preme Court "to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determin-
ations. 127 The State of Minnesota appealed the decision to the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1257,8 and certiorari was
granted.
1T Id. at A-27.
Is Id. at A-29.
19 1d. at A-32.
2 0 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d at 81.
21 The court made no findings on the other issues considering its analysis of the equal pro-
tection issue sufficient to resolve the due process challenge. The court decided it was unneces-
sary to address the Commerce clause issue having resolved the case on the basis of equal
protection. Id. at 87, n.20.
22 1d. at 82.
2 3 1 d. at 83. Reports on the problems of solid waste disposal and energy depletion were com-
piled by the Midwest Research Institute, the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
The Weyerhauser Corporation, a milk packaging group working for the Ministry of Environ-
ment in the province of Ontario, Canada and a 1969 study, the "Egg-Shell Report", on
the disposable characteristics of containers. id. at n.13.
24 Id. at 87.
25 Id. (Wahl, J., dissenting).
26 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S 641 (1966)).
27 427 U.S. at 303 (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
28 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1976) provides that:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed as . . . follows: . . . (3) By writ of
certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.
29 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 445 U.S. 9149 (1980).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court, like the district court below it, recog-
nized that this was economically and environmentally motivated and there-
fore applied the rational-basis test"0 for constitutionality under the Equal
Protection clause.3 The Supreme Court of the United States agreed that the
correct test had been applied and found that the only controversy to be
resolved was whether the "classification between plastic and nonplastic non-
returnable milk containers is rationally related to achievement of the statu-
tory purposes."'" However, in applying the same standard, the Court reached
an opposite conclusion and reversed the Minnesota courts.83
The Supreme Court, through Justice Brennan, almost dismissed
the argument against constitutionality without even looking at the
merits of the opposing parties' claims. Justice Brennan suggested that since
the state courts admitted that the evidence was "in sharp conflict,"3 the
constitutionality of the statute was at least debatable. If so, it was reasoned,
the challengers of the statute could not prevail under the rational-basis
test. 5 The Court, however, did proceed to evaluate the merits of the re-
spective contentions.
The State of Minnesota claimed that the Minnesota Supreme Court
had impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the legislature by
analyzing the statute afresh under the equal protection clause." The state
claimed the statute bore a rational relationship to the legitimate state
goals of non-proliferation of disposable containers, promotion of energy
conservation, minimization of economic dislocation associated with move-
30 When a statute is challenged as being violative of the Equal Protection clause, there are
at least three possible standards by which that statute may be measured to determine its
validity.
Under the "rational-basis" test the party attacking the statute must show that the
classification bears no reasonable relation to the state interest to which it is directed, that
it is arbitrary. The Court will give discretion to state Legislatures acting under their police
powers and allow them to provide for some inequality in classification. This test is con-
sistently applied in analyzing statutes that are predominantly economic.
The "strict scrutiny" test is utilized when a classification involves either a suspect class
(i.e. race or alienage) or a fundamental right (i.e. voting or travel). When this test is em-
ployed, the state must show more than a rational relation to a legitimate state interest; it
must show that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest
and that the means chosen, although intrusive, are the least drastic means available.
An intermediate test has judicially emerged to meet criticism of the use of the two-test
approach. The burden under the "rational-relation" test is so great that generally statutes
tested under it are found to be valid while application of the "strict-scrutiny" test more
frequently result in a finding that the classification is impermissable. The intermediate review
requires that the classification bear a fair and substantial relationship to the legitimate state
interest. Classifications regarding sex or legitimacy have been subjected to the intermediate
standard. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNsTITUTONA LAW, 524-
26, 1978.
31 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d at 81.
3 2 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 723.
33 Id. at 727.
3Id. at 724.
85 id.
86 Brief of Petitioner, 27-56, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981).
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ment toward greater use of "environmentally superior containers" and easing
the solid waste disposal problem.17
The milk packagers contended that because the district court specifically
found that the actual purpose of the act was to protect the economic in-
terests of certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries over
the economic interests of out-of-state segments of the dairy and plastic
industries, 8 there was no factual basis for banning the plastic containers.
Moreover, there was evidence to suggest that the plastic bottle had been
in wide use in Minnesota for years.3" Finally, it was argued that the statute
would not encourage a move toward greater use of returnable containers and
would only complicate the solid waste problem."°
Justice Brennan found the state arguments "fully supportable."'" He
emphasized the fact that states need not strike at all evils at the same time
or in the same way and that a legislature may implement its program
step-by-step. " The decision raised two additional theorems which merit
individual attention.
First, the Court proclaimed that "the Equal Protection Clause is
satisfied by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could rationally
have decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster
greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives." 3 This differs from
the axiom long favored by the Court" because it requires the rational
relationship to be drawn from any demonstrated facts rather than from
those facts which are imaginable. While this approach is not new," it does
allow for the novel holding in this case.
Second, Justice Brennan found that "it is not the function of the courts
to substitute their evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature."'
This language is similar to that found in Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri,"'
where it was declared that "we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh
the wisdom of the legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it
expresses offends the public welfare." 8 This maxim has been interpreted as
delineating conduct to be avoided by the Supreme Court. 9 A careful ex-
37 101 S. Ct. at 725-27.
38 Id. at 722.
89 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d at 86.
40 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 723-24.
41 Id. at 725.
42 Id.
4Ad. (emphasis added).
"See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
45See e.g. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
4Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 727 (emphasis added).
47 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
,1 Id. at 423.
9 Nevr Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
[V/ol. 15:2
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amination of Justice Brennan's holding in Clover Leaf Creamery Co. will
reveal that the restraint from acting as a superlegislature is being extended
to state courts as well." This appears to be true at least within the confines
of applying a rational-basis test to a statute challenged as violating the
Equal Protection clause.
Having rejected the contention that the statute violated the Equal
Protection clause, the Court next considered whether the regulation was
prohibited by the Commerce clause. This consideration was initiated despite
the Court's self-imposed policy of avoiding constitutional decisions when-
ever possible." The Court felt justified in this departure in that the issue
had been fully briefed and argued and because of the factual similarities
between Equal Protection and Commerce clause analysis.5 Justice Powell's
opinion in the case questioned the wisdom of such a departure."
The Commerce clause, like the Equal Protection clause, has under-
gone extensive interpretation and application over the years. Yet, unlike
the Equal Protection clause, no readily definable set of standards have
been developed with which to test the constitutionality of statutes under the
Commerce clause.' Rather:
Case law interpreting the clause has gradually created a multi-
faceted approach to assessing the validity of such state action. Gen-
erally, the rule is that the regulation will be upheld only if it is ration-
ally related to a legitimate state purpose and the resultant burden
on interstate commerce is outweighed by the state interest involved. 55
The milk packagers, relying on the argument that the statute had a
discriminatory purpose of favoring in-state over out-of-state concerns, con-
tended that the statute was the embodiment of economic protectionism."
They felt that the regulation would halt the flow of goods at the state border
and thus impose too great a burden on interstate commerce as compared
to the putative local benefits."
The state countered by arguing that while some burdens might be
placed on interstate commerce, incidental burdens on that commerce are
acceptable." The state further argued that the statute burdened both local
50 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 726.
51 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach a decision on this issue and the case could
have been remanded for such a determination or avoided altogether.
52 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 727, n.14.
53 Id. at 729-30 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54 Note, State Environment Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HAav. L.
REV. 1762, 1763-64 (1974).
55 Id. at 1764.
56 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 727, n.15.
57 ld.. at 728.
58Reply Brief of the Petitioner, 4-21, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co,, 101 S. Ct.
715 (1981).
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and out-of-state retailers in an equal fashion. 9 Moreover, most retailers,
if not all, were still packaging milk in various containers and could shift
production away from plastic containers without too much economic dis-
location.6"
The Court found that the statute regulated "evenhandedly" by pro-
hibiting all milk retailers from selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable
containers.61 The Court was persuaded by the fact that the milk products
would continue to flow freely across the border, "since most dairies package
their products in more than one type of container.""2 It was pointed out
by the Court that the packagers had suggested "no approach with a lesser
impact on interstate activities." 3 The Court concluded that,
A nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes
is not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from
a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state in-
dustry. Only if the burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs
the State's legitimate purposes does such a regulation violate the Com-
merce Clause. "
Two important facts regarding the milk industry in this case fortify
the Court's reasoning. In Minnesota, packagers utilized a number of differ-
ent types of packaging materials to ship milk to the consumer. 5 Moreover,
the plastic milk jugs which were the subject of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co. were late arrivals on the scene in Minnesota. These factors
alone may not have been enough to tip the scales used in Commerce clause
analysis to the side of the state. The presence of the alternative containers,
however, minimized the burden the statute placed on the milk indus-
try in several ways. First, the economic dislocation associated with
a switch to another type of container would be minimized. Second, this
would allow the flow of goods across the Minnesota border to continue
without serious interruption." The combination of these factors made it
logical in this case to find that the legislative ban did not burden interstate
commerce.
59Id.
6 0 Economic dislocation is a descriptive term referring to the job losses and plant closings that
often accompany a shift to a new method of production.
61 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. at 728.
621d.
63 Id. at 729.
"Id. The court is referring to the pulpwood industry as the predominantly in-state industry
which may have benefitted from the regulation by a shift to paperboard containers.
65 Id. at 728.
66 Easily distinguishable is the brewing industry. Since establishing nationwide operations,
brewers have become virtually dependent upon nonreturnable cans and bottles. A ban on
those containers in that industry would more easily constitute an impermissable interference
with commerce. See Greef & Martin, supra note. 1, at 367-75, for a discussion of state con-
tainer legislation and its effect on interstate commerce.
[Vol. 15:2
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CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Clover Leaf Creamery Co. reaffirmed the ap-
plication of the rational-basis standard when a statute encompassing eco-
nomic concerns is challenged under the Equal Protection clause. The
decision continues to recognize the viability and acceptability of a step-
by-step approach when states seek to ameliorate environmental problems.
The opinion may, however, go beyond affirming past Court holdings.
Justice Brennan felt that, in this limited context, not only will the Supreme
Court not sit as a superlegislature to review the wisdom of state regulations
but that state courts will be similarly restrained. A greater amount of de-
ference to state legislative decision-making may result; in fact, the opinion
may be construed as an invitation for state legislatures to seize a more
active role in reducing environmental problems in areas involving no funda-
mental rights or suspect classes.
Even more than encouraging the legislatures to take a more active
role in this context, the opinion seems to reward the State of Minnesota
for enacting this particular legislation. By enacting the restriction before
the undesirable container became embedded in the industry and commerce
of Minnesota, the legislature encouraged merchants both inside and outside
the state to make use of the readily available alternatives to the banned
containers. The Court seems to have been sufficiently impressed by the
practical advantages and workability of the statute. One could infer that
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